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ABSTRACT 
 
The series LLC has gained slow, consistent popularity among 
states over the past two decades, and this popularity will only continue to 
grow with the upcoming publication of a Uniform Act. Despite this 
increase in adoption, there is a dearth of academic literature advising 
state policymakers of the benefits and risks of adopting the entity form. 
The series LLC could provide a much-needed economic boost for small 
businesses in this tough economic climate, growing the state tax base, 
while increasing efficiency, and decreasing bureaucratic red tape. The 
series LLC statute ultimately adopted by states should balance pro-
creditor and pro-business interests to the fullest extent possible. This 
balance is best achieved by (1) constructing the statute to minimize risks 
in bankruptcy for businesses by incorporating many of the equity factors 
of substantive consolidation into the language, while (2) encouraging 
bankruptcy courts to adopt a rebuttable presumption of “separateness” to 
allow creditors a chance to rebut the presumption and recover.   
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The series LLC offers policymakers an inexpensive way to 
promote economic growth and new business formation. Many states are 
still recovering from the post-2008 economic slump, and are looking for 
a way to stimulate their local economies. With the anticipated 2017 
release of the final version of the Limited Liability Company Protected 
Series Act,1 there has never been a better time to consider the many 
potential benefits of adopting the series LLC (SLLC).  
The SLLC is one of the newest iterations of the unincorporated 
business form. The entity consists of a parent LLC, which forms cell 
companies, or “series,” separate from the parent and one another, to 
insulate risks, liabilities, and assets. Although the series form could be 
adopted by any business, it provides the most obvious benefits to small 
businesses by allowing these smaller, local entrepreneurs to save 
thousands annually in state filing fees. In the aggregate, this could add up 
to millions of dollars. These savings can then be reinvested in opening a 
storefront, expanding business, and generally growing the local 
                                                          
1 Anticipated July 2017, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform 
State Laws will release the final version of the Limited Liability Company 
Protected Series Act. [hereinafter Ltd. Liab. Co. Protected Series Act (July 2016 
Draft)], https://perma.cc/HMC9-T9ZY.  
3
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economy. Or, foreign LLCs may be more likely to enter the market as an 
SLLC, thereby increasing out-of-state investment.  
This article is the first to specifically address state policymakers, 
by suggesting the optimal statutory scheme for adoption that borrows 
equity factors from bankruptcy to minimize risks to businesses electing 
to use this form.2 Additionally, this article is the first to articulate how a 
series LLC should be treated in substantive consolidation once in 
bankruptcy.3 Much of the previous scholarship in this area has simply 
posed the many unanswered questions about series LLCs like choice of 
law, and tax or bankruptcy treatment.4 Ultimately, most of this 
scholarship warns practitioners against the SLLC lest he or she 
unintentionally ill-advise a client to adopt a risky, untested business 
form.5 But how will these questions ever be answered if more states do 
                                                          
2 See discussion infra Part III.  
3 Generally, most articles about series LLCs will mention the potential risk that 
substantive consolidation poses. However, a few articles have listed several 
options for treatment by courts (not just in substantive consolidation, but also in 
veil piercing and other litigation). See Steven J. Boyajian, Code to Code, Series 
LLCs: Can a Series File for Bankruptcy and What If It Does?, 35-3 ABIJ 24 
(March 2016) (explaining eligibility under the Bankruptcy Code and some 
important facets of series LLCs that may complicate bankruptcy proceedings).   
4 See Sandra Mertens, Note, Symposium: Who Owns Your Body? Series Limited 
Liability Companies: A Possible Solution to Multiple LLCs, 84 CHI.-KENT L. 
REV. 271 (2009); Bernie K. Ray, Comment, Respecting the Concept and Limited 
Liability of a Series LLC in Texas, 42 ST. MARY’S L.J. 501 (2011); Bruce H. 
White, Utah Series LLC –The Risk of Use Continues To Be Uncertain, 29 UTAH 
BAR J. 24 (2016); Terence Floyd Cuff, Delaware Series LLCs and Transaction 
Practice – Part 3, 39 REAL EST. TAX’N 35 (2011); Justin T. Fezzi, Comment, 
Third Time’s a Charm: How The Uniform Law Commission Can Fit Series 
LLCs Into the Uniform Limited Liability Company Act, 58 ST. LOUIS L.J. 911 
(2014).  
5 Mertens, supra note 4, at 311 (“[T]he plethora of unanswered questions 
surrounding series LLCs, the potential pitfalls, and the possibility to lose 
everything puts attorneys in an impossible predicament. . . . However, at this 
time, the concept is too ambiguous and incoherent.”); Ray, supra note 4, at 547 
(“Until binding decisions resolve these concerns, practitioners who find a series 
LLC an appropriate business form for their clients should proceed with caution 
and diligently heed a number of recommendations.”); White, supra note 4, at 28 
(“A lack of case law, particularly under the Bankruptcy Code, should be reason 
enough for one to not take the risk of using the Series LLC form.”); Cuff, supra 
note 4, at 35 (“Anyone involved with series LLCs should proceed with 
caution.”); Fezzi, supra note 4, at 915 (“Largest contributor to their lack of 
growth has been the glut of uncertainties regarding the treatment of series 
4
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not adopt, and more clients do not select, the SLLC form for their 
businesses?6  
States should adopt the series LLC business form to promote 
economic growth and efficiency, and decrease red tape, but maintain a 
balance between pro-creditor and pro-business interests. Without the 
wealth generated by healthy business, there is no tax-base to support 
important social welfare programs. The importance of balancing pro-
business interests with pro-creditor protections in economic policies such 
as this cannot be overstated. However, if structured correctly the SLLC 
balances these seemingly competitive interests by incentivizing 
individual series to protect their creditors.7  
The SLLC statute should be structured in such a way as to 
include the maximum number of equity factors from substantive 
consolidation doctrine in bankruptcy.8 Some of these factors are included 
in previous statutory language, like requiring separate record keeping for 
each series.9 But, including even more could increase protection for 
businesses should they find themselves declaring bankruptcy.10 For 
example, separating the members of the parent LLC from any of its 
protected series.11  
A rebuttable presumption of “separateness” for each protected 
series within the SLLC offers the best opportunity to balance pro-creditor 
interests in the bankruptcy context.12 Uncertainty of SLLC treatment in 
bankruptcy proceedings hinders the adoption of the business form.13 A 
rebuttable presumption provides a solution to this uncertainty: if a series 
has “dotted its I’s and crossed its T’s” throughout formation, annual 
filing, and bookkeeping, and the SLLC is not misusing its corporate 
                                                                                                                                  
LLCs.”). 
6 See Wendell Gingrich, Series LLCs: The Problem of the Chicken and the Egg, 
4 ENTREPEN. BUS. L.J. 193, 311(2009). 
7  Michael E. Fink, Comment, The Series LLC: Suggestions for Surviving Some 
Series Uncertainties, 72 U. PITT. L. REV. 597, 613-14 (2011) (“[T]he 
willingness or unwillingness of creditors to do with business with [the series 
LLC] would be the most telling.”).  
8 Meaning, if courts will look to consider whether bank accounts are 
commingled, include the inverse into the statutory language by requiring that 
businesses maintain separate accounts.  
9 See, e.g. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6 §18-215(b).  
10 See infra Part III.B.  
11 See infra Part III.B.i 
12 See infra Part IV.C.  
13 See Wendell Gingrich, Series LLCs: The Problem of the Chicken and the Egg, 
4 ENTREPEN. BUS. L.J. 193 (2009). 
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form, it will be rewarded with the rebuttable presumption of 
“separateness.” This allows creditors to recover from the individual 
protected series in which they invested, or to punish the whole SLLC for 
wrongdoing in formation. This rebuttable presumption holds true 
throughout analogous areas of the law like consolidated tax returns, and 
hedge funds.14  
This article consists of five parts. Part I will discuss the origins 
and different statutory forms of the series LLC. Part II will provide 
background information about substantive consolidation doctrine, 
including an overview of previous scholarship, and a discussion of the 
limited case law indicating how a series LLC may be treated in 
bankruptcy proceedings. Part III will argue states should adopt the series 
LLC form with a statutory form that minimizes the likelihood the 
protected series would be substantively consolidated in bankruptcy. Part 
IV will argue bankruptcy courts should resolve the uncertainty regarding 
treatment of series LLC by adopting a rebuttable presumption of 
separateness.  
 
II. DIFFERENT STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONS OF SERIES LLC 
LEGISLATION CREATE CONFUSION AMONG JURISDICTIONS  
 
Part I will trace the origins of the series LLC business form, 
through its first codification in Delaware in 1996 up through the present 
drafting of the Uniform Law Commission’s Model Act. It will also 
briefly discuss the international usage of the SLLC, and the different 
names given to roughly the same business form across different nations 
.  
A.  The Series LLC: Origin, Form, and Function 
 
Series LLCs are one of the newest, and potentially most 
important, innovations in corporate law in the past decade. The SLLC 
takes advantage of two types of internal liability shields: vertical and 
horizontal.15 Vertical shields protect from piercing or consolidation from 
subsidiary to parent, where horizontal shields protect entities and 
associations from brother-to-sister piercing or consolidation.16 Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that in states that have adopted the series LLC form, it 
                                                          
14 See infra Part IV.C.  
15 See Ltd. Liab. Co. Protected Series Act (July 2016 Annual Meeting Draft), 
supra note 1. 
16  Id. 
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is increasingly popular.17 “As of July 26, 2016 more than 26,000 
protected series were active under Illinois law.”18 Or, in Delaware, it is 
estimated that between 1000-1500 series are currently in use.19 Growing 
popularity is also evidenced by the number of states adopting the form, 
which in 2016 is now up to a total of 15 states.20  
Although it is clear that the form is growing in popularity, the 
reasons behind that growth are unclear and often different from state-to-
state. In fact, states are often adopting different variants of the law or 
tinkering with the type of statutory adoption.21 The type of SLLC statute 
discussed in this paper is more analogous to that of Illinois or Delaware 
where an additional Act was adopted to create a new entity form with 
asset partitioning and internal liability protection. In states like 
Minnesota,22 North Dakota,23 and Wisconsin,24 the word “series” does 
exist in their statutes. However, the word does not refer to asset 
partitioning or internal liability shields, rather it describes a type of 
ownership interest in a business resembling ownership interests in 
stock.25  
Some growth in the SLLC form can be explained as the 
manifestation of interest in the affiliated-business form. Managers and 
owners have been crafting and operating affiliated, families of businesses 
for years now.26 But often that form is only created through trial-and-
error, with the help of an attorney, ad hoc over many years. The series 
                                                          
17 Id. at 4.  
18 Id.  
19 See supra note 6. 
20 Delaware was the first state to adopt the series LLC in 1996. The next state to 
adopt the form, Oklahoma, did not do so until 2004. After that, adoption took off 
rapidly, as Illinois, Nevada, and Tennessee adopted the form in 2005. In 2008, 
Iowa became the sixth state to adopt the series LLC, followed by Texas in 2009. 
Non-states have also indicated interest in series LLCs, as Puerto Rico adopted 
them in 2009, followed by the District of Columbia in 2011. In 2012, Kansas 
adopted the series form, followed by Missouri, Montana, and Utah in 2013. 
Alabama adopted the series LLC in 2014. Indiana is the most recent state to 
adopt the series LLC at the writing of this article, with their adoption of the form 
in 2016.  
21 See infra, Part III.A.ii.   
22 See MINN. STAT. § 302A.137 (2016) 
23 See N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-32-02.55 (2016).  
24 See WIS. STAT. 183.0504 (2016).  
25 See supra note 1, at 4.  
26 See Amanda, J. Bahena, Note, Series LLCs: The Asset Protection Dream 
Machines?, 35 IOWA J. CORP. L. 799, 802 (2016).  
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LLC offers the opportunity to easily start a group of affiliated businesses 
from the very beginning.27 Further, much of the potential growth for the 
SLLC form is in the investment context.28 The SLLC allows for greater 
regulatory efficiency, and less government red tape, as only one 
regulatory filing need be made on behalf of all the affiliated businesses 
represented, the benefits of which are most readily obvious in the 
investment context.29  
 
i. Origins and Foundation  
 
The SLLC is a newer iteration of the Limited Liability 
Company, containing two types of internal liability shields: vertical, and 
horizontal.30 The form provides the same corporate-type liability 
protection with partnership-like tax treatment, plus the same contractual 
and organizational flexibility as the original LLC form.31 In this new 
evolution however, managers and members can take full advantage of 
that archetypal LLC organizational flexibility by creating separate 
divisions or classes, called “series” with their own members, managers, 
interests, and business purposes.32 SLLC statutes typically provide these 
series with separate judicial status; such as they can individually hold 
assets or contract for debt, in their own names.33  
 
1. Mutual Funds, Massachusetts Trusts, and 
Hedge Funds  
 
In 1996, Delaware officially adopted the SLLC business form, 
noting it is a creative derivation of the traditional mutual fund form into a 
corporate-type entity. A good example of the bridge between an SLLC 
and a mutual fund is the so-called “Massachusetts trust.”34  
                                                          
27 See Ltd. Liab. Co. Protected Series Act (July 2016 Annual Meeting Draft), 
supra note 1. 
28 Justin T. Fezzi, Comment, Third Time’s A Charm: How the Uniform Law 
Commission Can Fit Series LLCs into the Uniform Limited Liability Company 
Act, 58 ST. LOUIS L.J. 911, 914 (2014). 
29 Id. 
30 See supra note 1.  
31 Shannon L. Dawson, Series LLC and Bankruptcy: When the Series Finds 
Itself in Trouble, Will It Need Its Parent to Bail It Out?, 35 DEL. J. CORP. LAW 
515 (2010).  
32 Id. at 516.  
33 Id. 
34 Id.  
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A Massachusetts trust is a business form in which an investor is 
a grantor, who entrusts management of the trust’s assets to a trustee.35 
The investor/grantor’s liability is limited to the investment, similar to a 
limited partnership.36 These trusts can be formed in such a way that they 
too have series, and can be known as series trusts.37 Organizationally, 
series trusts and series LLCs have much in common: separate pools of 
assets, and the limitation of: (1) shareholders to the assets of which they 
own a membership interest, (2) debts and obligations to an individual 
asset, and (3) voting rights to a particular series.38 It may be instructive to 
look at how courts have treated these series trusts in past litigation. By 
implication that such series can elect their own tax status, they must be 
separate.39 Logically, a single entity would not have multiple tax 
classifications within a single year, so it would be odd to aggregate the 
parent trust and its series trusts.40  
In National Securities Series-Industrial Stock Series v. 
Commissioner, the court presumed “the series of a single investment 
trust would be classified as a distinct taxable entity.”41 The question in 
National Securities Series was whether amounts paid to shareholders on 
share redemption were preferential dividends, and therefore not 
includible as dividends paid for the calculation of a surtax credit.42 The 
court ultimately held that the payments were not preferential dividends 
and were includible in the credit calculation,43 implying that each 
plaintiff was a separate entity (from one another and the parent trust), 
because each was assessed a separate calculation of tax treatment.44  
In 1984, the IRS issued a General Counsel Memorandum (GCM) 
resolving the question of whether a “Massachusetts” business trust 
consisted of one or three taxable unincorporated entities.45 The “trust 
document authorized the establishment of separate investment portfolios, 
or funds, each of which was represented by a ‘separate series of 
                                                          
35 Id.  
36 See Massachusetts Trust, CORNELL UNIVERSITY LAW SCHOOL, available at 
https://perma.cc/KVW7-GJ9P. 
37 Dawson, supra note 31, at 518.  
38 Id. at 529-35.  
39 I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,211 (Jan. 13, 1984). 
40 Dawson, supra note 31, at 530.  
41 Nat’l Sec. Series-Indus. Stock Series v. Comm’r, 13 T.C. 884, 885 (1949). 
42 Id. 
43 Id. at 889.  
44 Dawson, supra note 31, at 531.  
45 I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,211 (Jan. 13, 1984).  
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shares.’”46 These series funds operated in ways much like a series LLC: 
(1) Each of these funds had different managers, investment objectives, 
assets, and shareholders;47 (2) the liabilities and expenses of each fund 
were assessed only against the assets of that fund;48 and, (3) voting 
matters applicable to one fund could only be voted on by the 
shareholders of said fund.49 Based on these characteristics of the series 
trusts, the IRS found them to be taxable as separate entities.50  
According to Shannon Dawson, this analogy is made less 
convincing when one looks to the differences between series trusts and 
series LLCs. In a trust, like the one referenced throughout the GCM, 
each individual trust had different ownership interests, unlike most series 
LLCs.51 Series trusts have different management schemes, whereas in a 
series LLC the operating agreement may or may not alter the 
management scheme between series.52 Series trusts are highly unlikely to 
engage in many joint activities, unlike a series LLC which often operates 
in various parts of the same, or connected, business.53 
 
2. International Iterations  
 
Interestingly, the series LLC is not only a Delaware/United 
States concept. Several other countries have them, or some variant, as 
well. Luxembourg established its variant of the series LLC, calling them 
“compartments” instead of “series.”54 Their statutory construction 
provides for the same internal liability shields, limiting creditors to the 
asset of their investment in the event of liquidation of that 
compartment.55 Luxembourg actually stipulates as to the “separateness” 
of each compartment, declaring that each shall be treated as a separate 
entity in all instances excepting its formation documents.56  
                                                          
46 Dawson, supra note 31, at 532.  
47 I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,211 (Jan. 13, 1984). 
48 Id.  
49 Id.  
50 Id. (“[E]ach fund is a separate and distinct economic entity consisting of 
separate pools of assets and streams of earnings. . .. Under these circumstances, 
we believe that the funds shall be classified as separate taxable entities.”). 
51 Dawson, supra note 31, at 533.  
52 Id.  
53 Id.  
54 Luxembourg Securitization Law of 2004 § 62(3). 
55 Id. at § 62(1), (2).   
56 Id. at § 62(3).  
10
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Other countries such as the Cayman Islands, the British Virgin 
Islands, Belize, Bermuda, Guernsey, and Mauritius all developed a 
variation of the “protected cell company” or “segregated portfolio 
company” much like Luxembourg or the Delaware.57 Many see the series 
LLC as the next step in the evolutionary development of unincorporated 
entities, particularly within the confines of American corporate law.58  
 
ii. Statutory Constructions   
 
Although fifteen states have adopted the SLLC entity, none have 
truly adopted the series in the same way. This article will examine three 
main statutory constructions: Delaware, Illinois, and the forthcoming 
Model Act.  
                                                          
57 Id.  
58 Dominick T. Gattuso, Series LLCS: Let’s Give the Frog a Little Love, 17 BUS. 
L. TODAY 33, 33 (July-Aug. 2008).  
11
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1. Delaware – 1996  
 
Delaware is the origin of the series LLC concept, and as such, it 
is of preeminent importance in the discussion of a series LLC statutory 
structure. Delaware law states, “[a] limited liability company agreement 
may establish or provide for the establishment of [one] or more 
designated series of members, managers, limited liability company 
interests, or assets.”59 Each series may establish its own lawful business 
or investment purpose, “whether or not it is for profit,”60 and is 
authorized with all the powers, duties, and rights of a limited liability 
company associated with its own individual assets, property, profits, or 
losses.61 The Delaware SLLC statute imbues a series with the rights to 
contract, hold title, grant liens, and sue and be sued, in its own name.62 
One of the more innovative features of the SLLC is that the debts, 
obligations, liabilities, and expenses of the series are not enforceable 
against another series or the parent.63 This separate liability protection is 
available provided that: (1) the assets held by one series are not 
commingled with the assets of another series, and (2) that notice of the 
limited liability nature of the series LLC form is set forth in the 
certificate of formation and the LLC agreement.64 
Individual series can still maintain different classes of members 
or managers, with different rights, powers, and obligations, provided 
they are established in the LLC agreement.65 One can be a member or 
manager for more than one series, and each series may have more than 
one member or manager.66 The dissolution of the parent LLC will cause 
the termination of all its series; however, an individual series may be 
wound up without any effect on the parent or other series.67 Interestingly, 
if the parent LLC becomes insolvent, that does not prevent a series from 
making a distribution.68  
 
                                                          
59 DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 6, § 18-215(a) (2016). 
60 Id. at § 18-215(c). 
61 Id. at § 18-215(a).  
62 Id. at § 18-215(c).  
63 Dawson, supra note 31, at 519.  
64 DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 6, §18-215(b).  
65 See Ltd. Liab. Co. Protected Series Act (July 2016 Annual Meeting Draft), 
supra note 1. 
66 DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 6, § 18-215(g) (2016). 
67 Id. § 18-215(k).  
68 Id. § 18-215(i).  
12
Journal of Business & Securities Law, Vol. 17 [2017], Iss. 2, Art. 4
http://digitalcommons.law.msu.edu/jbsl/vol17/iss2/4
  
 
 
Issue 2  Taking the Series LLC Seriously 219 
 
2. Illinois – 2005 
  
Nine years later, Illinois adopted its own variation of the SLLC 
form, making some significant improvements on Delaware’s statutory 
model. Illinois went so far as to provide that individual series exercise 
the powers of a limited liability company under Illinois law.69 Each 
series requires its own separately filed “certificate of designation” to 
remain on file with the Secretary of State, containing the name of each 
series and its members and managers, to provide notice to potential 
creditors of the limited liability nature of the series.70 Upon filing the 
certificate of designation, the series comes into being.71 Once marked 
“filed,” the certificate of designation provides conclusive evidence that 
all conditions precedent to formation were observed.  
Illinois also allows the series to elect to: consolidate their 
taxpayer status to single entity, contract jointly, work cooperatively, or 
be treated as a single business for purposes of qualification to do 
business in this or any other state.72 None of these elections affect the 
limited liability nature of the series, except where the series have 
specifically adopted joint liability by contract.73  
 
3. Model Act – July 2016 Annual Meeting 
Draft  
  
 The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State 
Laws (NCCUSL) first integrated the concept of “series” provisions into 
the Uniform Statutory Trust Act in 2008.74 From 2003 to 2006, the 
NCCUSL considered adding a series provision the Revised Uniform 
Limited Liability Company Act (RULLCA), but ultimately decided 
                                                          
69 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 180/37-40(b) (2010) (“A series with limited liability 
shall be treated as a separate entity to the extent set forth in the articles of 
organization. Each series with limited liability may, in its own name, contract, 
hold title to assets, grant security interests, sue and be sued and otherwise 
conduct business and exercise the powers of a limited liability company under 
this Act.”)  
70 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 180/37-40(d) (2016). 
71 Id. 
72 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 180/37-40(b) (2016). 
73 Id.  
74 See Mertens, supra note 4, at 305 (citing Unif. Statutory Trust Entity Act, 
Prefatory Note 2 (Annual Meeting Draft 2008)).  
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against it for seemingly “patriarchal” reasons.75 Namely, that other states 
did not engage in as sophisticated business ventures as Delaware, and 
there was risk that business owners may misunderstand and misuse the 
series LLC form.76 However, the growth and adoption of the series LLC 
continued, even among three jurisdictions that did adopt RULLCA.77 
Ultimately this led the NCCUSL to announce its formation of a Study 
Committee on Series of Unincorporated Business Entities in July of 
2011.78  
The Model Act is structured in such a way as to draw as many 
analogies as possible to existing limited liability law and simply 
“extrapolate” that law to apply to the series LLC form.79 For example, 
because almost all limited liability company statutes provide for 
management by members, it follows that an SLLC would operate in an 
analogous way (management by associated members of that protected 
series).80 A protected series is treated as though it were a separate limited 
liability company, and the default rules that come along with such 
treatment logically follow.81  
Under the Model form, separate public filings are necessary to 
create each protected series.82 Series are defined as legal persons.83 The 
name of the protected series must include the name of the series limited 
liability company, much like Illinois.84 The Model Act suggests using the 
abbreviation “P.S.” or “PS” in the name as well. The Commentary below 
§202 in the Proposed Model Act (Version from July 2016) suggests the 
filing of the certificate of designation, coupled with the naming 
                                                          
75 See Fezzi, supra note 4, at 917.  
76 Id. See also Progress Report on the Revised Uniform Limited Liability 
Company Act (ULLCA II) March 2008.  
77 Iowa, Utah, and the District of Columbia all adopted RULLCA, but added 
series provisions to the uniform statutes on their books. 
78 Uniform Law Commission, Annual Meeting of the Committee on Scope and 
Program, (July 8, 2011), available at https://perma.cc/Z8JB-ZXG3. 
79 Ltd. Liab. Co. Protected Series Act (July 2016 Annual Meeting Draft), supra 
note 1, at 8. 
80 Id.  
81 Id. at §103. Examples of the default rules provided for in §103 are as follows: 
(1) associated members of a protected series is treated as members of an LLC, 
(2) a series manager is treated as a person managing a separate company, (3) a 
transferable interest of a protected series is treated as a transferable interest of a 
separate company. Id.  
82 See § 201(b).  
83 See § 102(7).  
84 See § 202. p 
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requirements, “provide substantial transparency.”85 It should then be a 
matter of public record if: (1) a limited liability company is a series 
limited liability company, and (2) a specific organization is a protected 
series.86 Revealing also what protected series “belong” to a particular 
series LLC, or vice versa, upon searching.  
One of the innovations of the NCCUSL’s 2016 draft of the 
SLLC Uniform Act is to separate two related components of vertical 
liability: the non-liability rule and the non-recourse rule.87 The non-
liability refers to the separateness of protected series, in particular that 
one protected series is not liable for the debts of the series limited 
liability company or any of the other protected series.88 The non-recourse 
rule states that “each associated asset of a protected series is shielded 
against collection efforts of judgment creditors of the series [LLC] or of 
any other protected series of the company,”89 but that association is only 
accomplished by careful paperwork and record maintenance. Previous 
series LLC statutes have consolidated both of these pieces into the 
concept of vertical liability, but the proposed Model Act separates the 
non-recourse rule and reserves it as a “punishment” of sorts for a 
wrongdoing in formation or series/protected series management and 
operation.90 The formulation adopted by the NCCUSL also “creates an 
additional vulnerability;” however, a judgment debtor might easily 
recover from an associated asset (should the asset fail the nonrecourse 
requirement) in addition to recovering against the protected series from 
which they have sued.91  
 
B. Previous scholarship: Practitioners and Policymakers 
 
When reviewing the previous literature about SLLCs, several 
things became readily apparent. First, SLLCs are being discussed almost 
exclusively in practitioner materials or state bar journals. They are 
                                                          
85 See Ltd. Liab. Co. Protected Series Act (July 2016 Annual Meeting Draft), 
supra note 1, at §202. 
86 Id.  
87 Id. at 6.  
88 Id. at § 401(a)(2). 
89 Id. at § 103 (emphasis omitted).  
90 Id. at 6 (“[A]n asset owned by a protected series but not properly associated 
with the protected series is up for grabs not only to a person asserting claims 
against the protected series but also to a claimant against the series limited 
liability company and a claimant against any other protected series of the 
company.”).  
91 Id. at 8.  
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receiving relatively little treatment in academic literature, and then most 
of that literature is 6-8 years old. Second, and logically, the literature is 
written for a practitioner audience. Meaning, the articles are geared 
towards how to advise a client to the risks and benefits of using the 
SLLC form. Most articles generally conclude that the SLLC is too risky, 
has too many unanswered questions, and too many inconclusive answers, 
to advise a client to use it in good faith. As lawyers, no practitioner wants 
to advise a client to adopt an untested business form that may open that 
client up to untold and unforeseen liability.  
The SLLC suffers from a classic chicken-and-egg problem: if 
states do not adopt the SLLC form, the lingering questions about them 
will not be answered.92 But until the unresolved questions have some 
kind of resolution and more individuals indicate their intent to use the 
entity form, states postpone adoption of the form. This article will argue 
that states should adopt the SLLC form in its best possible form, to allow 
bankruptcy, and other, courts to begin resolving whatever leftover 
questions remain post-formation.93  
There is a dearth of literature advising policymakers on the 
proper statutory form, application, and benefits of the SLLC form. This 
article will attempt to fill that void. State policymakers should adopt the 
version of the SLLC that best fits with the existing laws of their state to 
prevent undue confusion and unnecessary overlap between statutory 
provisions. These statutes should, ideally, include as many of the factors 
borrowed from substantive consolidation as possible to minimize the 
likelihood that an SLLC would be consolidated should it become 
insolvent – one of the largest risks to business owners with multiple 
business ventures. In this way, when a bankruptcy court finally reviews 
an SLLC case on the merits, the SLLC will have a strong presumption of 
separateness in entities, as with other families of unincorporated entities.  
 
III. BANKRUPTCY CONCERNS, LIKE SUBSTANTIVE 
CONSOLIDATION, HINDER ADOPTION OF THE SERIES LLC FORM 
 
Part II provides background information on substantive 
consolidation doctrine in bankruptcy, and why it presents a unique risk to 
business owners wishing to form a series LLC. This section also gives an 
overview of existing literature about the SLLC in the bankruptcy context, 
                                                          
92 See Wendell Gingrich, Series LLCs: The Problem of the Chicken and the Egg, 
4 ENTREPEN. BUS. L.J. 193 (2009).  
93 See infra Part III-IV.  
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and discusses the limited previous case law and IRS rulings on the 
“personhood” of series LLCs.  
 
A. “Personhood” and the IRS Private Opinion Letter  
 
Under the United States Bankruptcy Code, “only a person that 
resides or has domicile, a place of business, or property in the United 
States, or a municipality, may be a debtor” for bankruptcy purposes.94 
The definition of “person” includes an “individual, partnership, and 
corporation.”95 Despite extensive revision in 2005, the Code has never 
been amended to explicitly include limited liability companies under the 
definition of a “person.”96 However, case law indicates that LLCs should 
be, and are, treated as “persons” for bankruptcy purposes.97 The question 
remains whether an individual series would be allowed to file for 
bankruptcy in its own right, in other words, is it a “person?” For 
example, if the Master LLC were required to file bankruptcy on behalf of 
Series 1, would the assets of all the other series also become part of the 
bankruptcy estate?98 If so, this would destroy the very internal liability 
shields that make the series LLC form innovative and attractive. Even if 
a state statute explicitly establishes internal liability protection, 
preemption doctrine dictates that federal courts need not necessarily 
follow those state protections, particularly not equity-based bankruptcy 
courts.99  
The first case to take up the issue of LLC’s “personhood” for 
bankruptcy purposes was In re ICLNDS Notes Acquisition, LLC 
(“ICLNDS”), which filed voluntary bankruptcy under Chapter 7.100 In 
that case, the court held that “corporations and partnerships are eligible 
                                                          
94 11 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2016).  
95 Id. at §101(4).  
96 See Dawson, supra note 31, at 521.  
97 See, e.g., In re ICLNDS Notes Acquisition, LLC, 259 B.R. 289, 292 (Bankr. 
N.D. Ohio 2001); In re KSM Props., LLC, 318 F.R. 712, 717 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 
2004); In re Midpoint Dev., LLC. 313 B.R. 486, 488-89 (W.D. Okla. 2004), 
rev’d on other grounds, No. 04-1509-R, slip op. at 7 (Banks. W.D. Okla. Fed. 3, 
2005), aff’d, 466 F. 3d 1201 (10th Cir. 2006); In re Calhoun, 312 B.R. 380, 383 
(Banks. N.D. Iowa 2004).  
98 Dawson, supra note 31, at 521.  
99 See Young v. United States, 535 U.S. 43, 50 (2002) (“[B]ankruptcy courts . . . 
are courts of equity and ‘appl[y] the principles and rules of equity 
jurisprudence.’” (quoting Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 304 (1939))).  
100 In re ICLNDS Notes Acquisition, LLC, 259 B.R. 289 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 
2001). 
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to be debtors, and because an LLC draws its character from both of those 
forms of doing business, an LLC is similar enough to those entities,” to 
file for bankruptcy.101 In ICLNDS, the court relied on the fact that LLCs 
were legal entities that shared characteristics of other entities explicitly 
granted the ability to file,102 particularly: (1) member-manager’s shield 
from personal liability, (2) organization for any lawful purpose, (3) 
management in proportion to capital contribution/ownership interest, and 
(4) partnership-like tax status.103 These characteristics may inform the 
likelihood that a series is found to be a “person” under the bankruptcy 
code. Most series LLC statutes are structured in such a way that they 
mimic or complement the structure of an LLC, which indicates that 
under the United States Bankruptcy Code a series would qualify as a 
person.104  
In 2008, the IRS issued a private letter ruling concerning a 
“Massachusetts” trust operating a closed-end mutual fund that wished to 
convert to a Delaware SLLC.105 The trustees divided the beneficial 
interests of the trust into several series, each with a separate portfolio.106 
The trust wanted to reorganize under Delaware law as an SLLC.107 Once 
the trust liquidated, the shareholders of each trust portfolio would then be 
vested with a membership interest in the series. The operating agreement 
restricted the transferability of shares, each series would maintain its own 
investment objectives, and the profits/losses of each series would only be 
assessed against that series108 – all the classic hallmarks of the SLLC 
form. When reorganizing, the series would have the opportunity to select 
whether they wished to be taxed as “Type D” (a single-member 
disregarded entity), “Type P” (a partnership), or “Type C” (an 
association taxable as a corporation).109 The IRS confirmed each series 
could select its own tax status according to the scheme listed above.110 
Meaning, the IRS treats each series as a separate taxable entity.111  
                                                          
101 Id. at 293.  
102 Id. at 292-93.  
103 Id. at 292.  
104 See supra, Part I (A)(2).  
105 I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 08-03-004 (Jan. 18, 2008).  
106 Id.  
107 Id.  
108 Id.  
109 Id.  
110 I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 08-03-004 (Jan. 18, 2008).  
111 Id.  
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The IRS resolved the question of tax status for a Delaware SLLC 
under the Delaware Code, and which provides persuasive guidance to 
courts that series are likely “persons” under the bankruptcy code.  
 
B. Primer: What is Substantive Consolidation?  
 
To many state policymakers, or indeed many non-corporate 
attorneys, the word “substantive consolidation” may be relatively 
unknown or unclear. For clarity, this section will provide a brief primer 
on substantive consolidation: what it is, its origins, and the risks it poses 
for unwary business owners. A general working definition of the doctrine 
states that bankruptcy courts may choose to “consolidate the assets and 
liabilities of different legal entities” so that they are treated as if they 
were held by a single entity.112 It is most easily explained as a kind of 
two-step process: first, the court looks to see whether the entities even 
qualify for substantive consolidation; if they do (or might), the court then 
moves to step two, to examine whether substantive consolidation is 
indeed proper for the creditors. There are several elements that are 
commonly used to test a substantive consolidation inquiry (infra), but no 
one factor is determinative. “A combination of elements showing a 
substantial relationship among the debtors [entities] is a predicate to 
substantive consolidation, but the existence of such a relationship alone 
will not support substantive consolidation.”113  
Bankruptcy law is uniquely situated in the law, as it is bound by 
the federal Bankruptcy Code but at the same time, operates primarily as a 
court of equity. Substantive consolidation occupies that strange middle 
ground of bankruptcy law, as it is not statutorily granted but rather is a 
part of the federal common law “emanat[ing] from equity.”114 However, 
this equitable power does find its origin in the Bankruptcy Code, which 
explicitly grants to courts the ability to “merg[e] or consolidat[e]” assets 
and liabilities of the debtors with other persons.115 In substantive 
consolidation, it is important to remember that the relationship between 
                                                          
112 2-105 COLLIER’S ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 105.09. The Third Circuit Court of 
Appeals defined substantive consolidation as “treat[ing] separate legal entities as 
if they were merged into a single survivor left with all the cumulative assets and 
liabilities (save for the inter-entity liabilities, which are erased).” In re Owens 
Corning, 419 F.3d 195, 205 (3rd Cir. 2005). 
113 2-105 COLLIER’S ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 105.09[a][ii][A]. 
114 In re Owens Corning, 419 F.3d 195, 205 (3rd Cir. 2005). 
115 11 U.S.C. §105(a).  
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the legal entities potentially being consolidated is much more important 
than the legal form of the entities.116  
The effect of substantive consolidation on unsecured creditors 
and equity holders cannot be overstated. Normally, the separate creditors 
of each debtor would receive a different percentage recovery on their 
claims from the separate estates of the debtors.117 However, the 
consolidation of the legal entities results in both unsecured creditors now 
receiving the same percentage recovery.118 Meaning, the creditors of the 
one receiving the higher percentage recovery on their claims if the 
debtors were separate will be negatively affected by the consolidation.119 
Because bankruptcy courts are well aware of the potential harm they may 
inflict on creditors, substantive consolidation is considered a power to be 
rarely exercised.120  
There is no set, prescribed legal standard for substantive 
consolidation. It is an ad hoc, fact-specific inquiry so there is little 
precedential value to previous substantive consolidation cases. The 
emerging standard of substantive consolidation, as stated by the 3rd 
Circuit in In re Owens Corning is what, in particular, presents such a 
potential risk to SLLCs.121 In that case, the court created a test 
concerning the types of entities for whom substantive consolidation 
makes sense, namely those where: (1) prior to petitioning for bankruptcy, 
the separateness of the entities was significantly disregarded to the point 
that creditors treated them as a single entity; or (2) the assets and 
liabilities of the entities are so muddled that separating them would be 
prohibitively difficult and likely would end up damaging all creditors. 
The Owens Corning court was careful to note that to qualify under the 
                                                          
116 2-105 COLLIER’S ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 105.09[c]. 
117 See COLLIER’ S, supra note 112, at 105.09. 
118 Id.  
119 Id.  
120 “[T]here appears to be nearly unanimous consensus that it is a remedy to be 
used ‘sparingly.’” In re Owens Corning, 419 F.3d 195, 205-06 (3rd Cir. 2005); 
see In re Aguie/Restivo Baking Co. Ltd., 860 F.2d 515, 518 (2nd Cir. 1988); see 
also Wells Fargo Bank v. Sommers (In re Amco Ins.), 444 F.3d 690, n.5 (5th 
Cir. 2006); Alexander v. Compton (In re Bonham), 229 F.3d 750, 767 (9th Cir. 
2000) (stating that “almost every other court has noted [substantive 
consolidation] should be used ‘sparingly’”) (citing In re Flora Mir Candy Co., 
432 F.2d 1060, 1062-63 (2d. Cir. 1970)); FDIC v. Colonial Realty Co., 966 F.2d 
57, 61, 26 C.B.C.2d 1687, 1693 (2d Cir. 1992); Chemical Bank New York Trust 
Co. v. Kheel, 369 F.2d 845, 847 (2d Cir. 1966).  
121 Owens, 419 F.3d at 195. 
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second rationale, the assets would have to be truly and hopelessly 
scrambled, and the threshold for such a mess is very high.122  
Once the inquiry has moved past whether substantive 
consolidation is possible for these entities, the bankruptcy courts begins 
to look at a list of elements relating to the nature of the entities, their 
relationship, and their creditors themselves to determine if substantive 
consolidation is proper. These elements123 include:  
 
(1) Parent corporation owns all or a majority of the capital stock 
of the subsidiary;  
(2) Parent and subsidiary have common officers and directors;  
(3) Parent finances subsidiary;  
(4) Parent is responsible for incorporation of subsidiary;  
(5) Subsidiary has grossly inadequate capital;  
(6) Parent pays salaries, expenses, or losses of subsidiaries;  
(7) Subsidiary has substantially no business except with parent;  
(8) Subsidiary has essentially no assets except for those 
conveyed by parent;  
(9) Parent refers to subsidiary as department or division of 
parent;  
(10) Director or officers do not act in interests of subsidiary, but 
take directions from parent;  
(11) Formal legal requirements of the subsidiary as a separate and 
independent corporation are not observed.124  
(12) Degree of difficulty in segregating and ascertaining 
individual assets and liabilities;  
(13) Presence or absence of consolidated financial statement;  
(14) Profitability of consolidation at a single physical location;  
(15) Poor record-keeping or commingling of assets and business 
functions; 
(16) Unity of interests and ownership between various corporate 
entities; 
(17) Existence of parent and inter-corporate guarantees on loans; 
and,  
                                                          
122 Id. at 214.  
 
124 In re Tureaud, 45 B.R. 658, 662 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1985), aff’d, 14 
C.B.C.2d 1131, 59 B.R. 973 (N.D. Okla. 1986) (citing Fish v. East, 114 F.2d 
177 (10th Cir. 1940), and in In re Gulfco Inc. Corp., 593 F.2d 921 (10th Cir. 
1979)).  
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(18) Transferring assets without formal observance of corporate 
formalities.125  
 
Additionally, the “alter ego” theory is commonly mentioned in 
connection with substantive consolidation.126 This term is used to refer to 
a group of affiliate entities that, like those elements listed above, have 
failed to observe some corporate formalities, but to the point where the 
entities are not “functionally distinct.”127 The corporation is merely the 
“alter ego” of its shareholder, used interchangeably. If it is apparent that 
one series is being used interchangeably with the parent series or another 
horizontal series, courts may consider them simply a unitary whole.  
Over time, and as the case law of substantive consolidation has 
developed, courts have increasingly addressed concerns about the 
potential creditor prejudice that arises in substantive consolidation. Many 
courts now engage in a balancing analysis based on the Snider Bros 
decision, which essentially examines the common elements listed above, 
combined with equity factors. To summarize, first, a court determines if 
there is a substantial identity between the entities (using the common 
elements supra). Second, is consolidation necessary to prevent a harm or 
infer a benefit. Third, if a creditor objects, he must provide evidence that 
he did not rely on the separateness of the entities’ credit. And fourth, 
there must be enough evidence available that the benefit counterbalances 
or far outweighs the harm.128  
 
C. Previous Scholarship About Series LLCs and 
Substantive Consolidation 
  
Most articles about the SLLC at least mention substantive 
consolidation as a recurring concern, but so far only two articles have 
                                                          
125 (12) to (18) come from more recent trends in substantive consolidation case 
law. In re Vecco Constr. Indus., Inc., 2 C.B.C.2d 216, 219, 4 B.R. 407, 410 
(Bankr. E.D. Va. 1980); see also Kapila v. S&G Fin. Servs., LLC (In re S&G 
Fin. Servs. of S. Fla., Inc.,), 451 F.R. 573, 583-84 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2011); In re 
Raymond Prof’l Grp., Inc. v. William A. Pop Co (In re Raymond Prof’l Grp., 
Inc.), 438 B.R. 130, 138 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2010); R2 Invs. LDC v. World 
Access, Inc. (In re World Access, Inc.), 301 B.R. 217, 272-74 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 
2003).  
126  
127 2-105 COLLIER’S ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 105.09[a][ii][A]. 
128  In re Snider Bros., 18 B.R. 230, 234 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1982) (this test has 
been widely adopted in numerous courts see 2-105 COLLIER’S ON BANKRUPTCY 
¶ P 105.09 at Fn. 60.  
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focused in-depth on the potential ramifications of the SLLC in 
bankruptcy, specifically whether an individual series can be a “person” 
under the bankruptcy code and Delaware law.129 No article has attempted 
to articulate how substantive consolidation might work should an SLLC 
find itself in the midst of bankruptcy.130 
This is one of the most important questions about the SLLC, as 
its very nature includes some of the elements listed above. For example, 
a parent SLLC “incorporates” or creates its subsidiary series; the separate 
legal status and documentation of a series and parent may not be all that 
substantial (in some states it may require no paperwork at all); or, some 
SLLCs may operate theoretically different components of a unitary 
business. However, there is a shift in substantive consolidation to 
consider the traditional elements more of a unitary whole in the greater 
balancing analysis, weighing them against prejudice to creditors, 
necessity of consolidation, and reliance by creditors on the separate 
credit of separate entities. 131 
This is where the SLLC may have a stronger argument that 
substantive consolidation is improper. If the statute is structured 
properly, the SLLC should give creditors plenty of notice that they are 
indeed investing in a “series” which is much more equitable to creditors 
than owning multiple LLCs (which they would be unlikely to know up 
front but could still be subject to consolidation later). Further, drafting 
the series LLC statute in such a way can minimize the “fit” with 
substantive consolidation elements. For example, including provisions 
requiring rigorous record-keeping for each individual series, and 
especially for inter-series transfers, and requiring each series to maintain 
its own accounts to prevent commingling of assets.  
 
D. Case Law 
 
i. Alphonse v. Arch Bay Holdings, Inc.  
 
Glenn E. Alphonse’s Louisiana home was foreclosed on in 2010, 
and rather than challenging the foreclosure itself or appealing in state 
court, Alphonse chose to sue in federal district court under the Louisiana 
                                                          
129 See Dawson, supra note 31, at 521; see also Boyajian, supra note 3.  
130  See supra note 3.   
131  J. Stephen Gilbert, Note, Substantive Consolidation in Bankruptcy: A 
Primer, 42 VAND. L. REV. 207, 216 (1990) (“Courts may ignore the presence or 
absence of certain factors in order to fashion relief equitably under 
consolidation.”).  
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Unfair Trade Practices Act (“LUTPA”).132 He originally obtained his 
mortgage from WMC Mortgage Corporation, who later assigned it to the 
Delaware entity Arch Bay Holding LLC-Series 2010B.133 Upon 
commencement of his federal district court action, Alphonse sued Arch 
Bay Holdings, LLC (“Arch Bay,” the parent LLC) alleging Arch Bay 
“wrongfully seized and possessed his home through essentially 
fraudulent means.”134 Among other holdings, the district court 
determined that Alphonse’s LUTPA claims against Arch Bay should be 
dismissed because Delaware law governs Arch Bay’s liability, and under 
Delaware law, “Series 2010B is the real party in interest” to this suit, not 
Arch Bay.135 In between the district court’s decision and appeal, the Fifth 
Circuit decided Truong v. Bank of America, which Arch Bay argued 
nevertheless did not affect the outcome of the present facts “because of 
res judicata and Series 2010B’s separate juridical status.”136 
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit asked “whether there exist[ed] 
sufficient ‘identity of the parties’ between Arch Bay (the parent 
company) and Series 2010B (the judgment creditor).”137 “[T]he separate 
juridical status of a Series LLC . . . remains an open question.”138 And 
ultimately, the Court remanded the case because of an insufficiency of 
facts in the record to determine whether Series 2010B was truly a 
separate entity.139 However, they did instruct the district court that its 
application of Delaware law may not have been correct because it is 
unclear whether the liability of a “series” is external or internal.140 If it is 
an internal liability, the law of the state of incorporation governs those 
conflicts, whereas that same law does not necessarily govern conflicts 
regarding rights of third parties (external) to the LLC.141 The Court held 
that dismissal was improper because the district court failed to evaluate 
the internal/external liability question under Louisiana law.142  
 
                                                          
132 Alphonse v. Arch Bay Holdings, Inc., 548 Fed. Appx. 979, 981 (5th Cir. 
2013).  
133  Id. at 980.  
134 Id. 
135 Id. at 981. (“In other words, Alphonse sued the wrong defendant.”).  
136 Id. at 982.  
137 Id. at 983.  
138 Id. at 984.  
139 Id.  
140 Id. at 986.  
141 Id. (quoting First Nat’l City Bank v. Banco Para El Comerico Exterior de 
Cuba, 462 U.S. 611 (1983)).  
142 Alphonse, 548 Fed. Appx. at 986. 
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ii. GxG Mgmt. v. Young Bros. & Co., Inc.  
 
Currently, the only case to ever address the treatment of a 
foreign SLLC in a non-SLLC jurisdiction is GxG Management LLC v. 
Young Bros. & Co., Inc., although its holding is now slightly outdated.143 
A Maine federal district court applied Delaware law in determining 
whether a series of a Delaware SLLC could be joined as a party to a 
lawsuit in Maine.144 In this case, the series form was being used to 
maintain and manage the affairs of the Goelet family including various 
family residences, and the boat they used to transport family members 
between those residences.145 That boat experienced significant engine 
and hull problems, resulting in the retention of the Young Bros. & Co. 
for maintenance.146  
Maine lacked an SLLC statute itself, but recognized a “special 
relationship” between a Delaware SLLC and its series.147 In 2007, when 
the Court decided this case, Delaware did not have statutory language 
explicitly stating that a series has the capacity to sue and be sued.148 The 
Court also raised the question of whether the parent LLC assigned all of 
its rights under the Young Bros. & Co. contract to its Series B.149 In its 
reply brief, GxG Management, LLC stated that it was “not a separate 
entity from ‘Series B” and “[did] not create a separate entity that stands 
alone for all purposes under Delaware law.”150 Without directly 
addressing the issue of separateness between a series and its parent 
SLLC, the court held the parent and series had a sufficient unity of 
interest, “such that neither could obtain a judgment against Young Bros. 
for these same events.”151  
Previous literature suggests this does not bode well for the future 
of the series LLC, as in this case, the Court essentially treated them as 
the same entity.152 However, this is an incorrect generalization. The court 
never explicitly states it does not recognize “separateness” between the 
                                                          
143 GxG Management LLC v. Young Bros. 7 Co., Inc., Civil No. 05-162-B-K, 
2007 WL 551761 (D. Me. 2007).  
144 Id. at *7.  
145 Id. at *1.  
146 Id. at *4.  
147 Id. at *1.  
148 Id. at *7. 
149 GxG Management LLC, 2007 WL 551761 at *8 (no evidence was produced 
at trial to alleviate this concern).  
150 Id. at *7 (quoting Pl.’s reply at 4).  
151 Id. at *8.  
152 See Bahena, supra note 26, at 803.  
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parent and series.153 Rather the court has reservations about the notion of 
“separateness,” questions that remained unresolved based on the 
record.154 This case spurred the Delaware legislature to amend its series 
LLC statute to explicitly stipulate the rights of series to sue and be sued 
in their own name,155 thereby clarifying some of the court’s reservations 
about the separateness of series.  
 
IV. ARGUMENT: STATES SHOULD ADOPT A STATUTORY 
CONSTRUCTION OF THE SERIES LLC THAT MINIMIZES THE RISK 
OF SUBSTANTIVE CONSOLIDATION  
 
Part III will argue states should adopt the SLLC business form to 
promote economic growth, decrease bureaucratic red tape, and 
incentivize the creation of new businesses. But, the SLLC should be 
adopted with a very specific statutory structure in mind: one that includes 
equity factors borrowed from substantive consolidation to minimize the 
risks SLLCs face in bankruptcy proceedings.  
 
A. Economic Policy: Good for the State Economy  
 
Currently, an individual could just operate several single-
member LLCs to manage multiple businesses.156 However, this does not 
necessarily accomplish the same end.157 Facially, to the extent that an 
individual could operate multiple businesses, multiple LLCs operate 
much like an SLLC.158 But, with multiple LLCs an individual is paying 
thousands of dollars annually in multiple filing fees with the Secretary of 
State’s office and the administrative costs of preparing the multiple filing 
documents, the SLLC presents a clear advantage. Additionally, and often 
overlooked, it is important to point out that maintaining multiple single-
member LLCs bears many of the same risks of veil-piercing and 
                                                          
153  GxG Management LLC, 2007 WL 551761 at *8. 
154 Id.  
155  See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6 § 18-215(c) (West 2016).  
156 Ltd. Liab. Co. Protected Series Act (July 2016 Annual Meeting Draft), supra 
note 1, at Prefatory Note (“For the most part, the legal and business relationships 
established through a protected series can also be established with various 
structures involving several limited liability companies.”). 
157 See Mertens, supra note 4, at 272. 
158 See Fezzi, supra note 4, at 914.  
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substantive consolidation as the SLLC, but with higher operating 
costs.159  
The series LLC is one of the newest permutations of the limited 
liability company business form.160 As yet, it remains mostly untested, as 
it has been adopted by only fifteen states and Puerto Rico.161 Much of the 
previous literature regarding series LLCs discusses the potential benefits 
and risks for a client to form their business as a series.162 However, the 
concerns of state policymakers are vastly different from that of an 
individual business owner. Instead, policymakers want to ensure that, in 
the aggregate, they can benefit their state and local economy. This article 
will argue the series LLC has the potential to revolutionize small 
business, incentivize foreign registration in states, and promote overall 
economic growth.  
The main attraction of the series LLC is the tax break it provides 
to small business. Although theoretically, a business of any size could 
form as a series LLC, it provides the most potential benefits to small 
businesses. In the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, small businesses 
were increasingly pushed out of the market, crippled by debt.163 
Essentially, a series LLC allows a parent company to file one form with 
the Secretary of State and then create smaller, separate “series” 
companies without additional filings (and filing fees) with the state. 
                                                          
159 Larry E. Ribstein & Robert R. Keatinge, RIBSTEIN AND KEATINGE ON 
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES §4:17 (2d ed. 2012).  
160  Dominick T. Gattuso, Series LLCS: Let’s Give the Frog a Little Love, 17 
BUS. L. TODAY 33, 33 (July/Aug. 2008). 
161 See supra, Part I, Section (A). Delaware was the first state to adopt the series 
LLC in 1996. The next state to adopt the form was Oklahoma, but not until 
2004. After that, adoption took off rapidly, as Oklahoma was closely followed 
by Illinois, Nevada, and Tennessee in 2005. In 2008, Iowa became the sixth 
state to adopt the series LLC form, followed by Texas in 2009. Non-states have 
also indicated interest in series LLCs, as Puerto Rico adopted them in 2009, 
followed by the District of Columbia in 2011. In 2012, Kansas adopted the 
series form, followed by Missouri, Montana, and Utah in 2013. Alabama 
adopted the series LLC in 2014. Indiana is the most recent state to adopt the 
series LLC at the writing of this article.  
162 See Mertens, supra note 4, at 311; see also Kray, supra note 4, at 547; see 
also White, supra note 4, at 28.  
163 Arthur B., Kennickell, Myron L. Kwast & Jonathan Pogach, SMALL 
BUSINESSES AND SMALL BUSINESS FINANCE DURING THE FINANCIAL CRISIS AND 
THE GREAT RECESSION: NEW EVIDENCE FROM THE SURVEY OF CONSUMER 
FINANCES, FINANCE AND ECONOMICS DISCUSSION SERIES 2015-039, 
WASHINGTON: BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM 
(2015), available at https://perma.cc/GYY3-VTDH. 
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Depending on the state’s fee structure, this could mean thousands of 
dollars in savings for any individual business owner who currently 
operates multiples LLCs. In the aggregate, this is potentially tens of 
millions of dollars in state filing fees.  
The SLLC not only saves money, but also lowers administrative 
costs by decreasing bureaucratic red tape. Further, the SLLC offers the 
same benefits of diversification of risk as operating multiple single-
member LLCs. Rather than having to invest in a business as a whole, an 
investor can select one specific series, choosing perhaps a higher or 
lower risk option.  
 
i. Free-Market Economic Schools of Thought: Austria 
and Chicago  
 
The free-market benefits of individual action and reduced 
government interference are the most obvious benefits of the adoption of 
the series LLC. Most pertinent to the discussion here is the Austrian view 
of the intersection between social institutions, law, and market decisions. 
164 In Friedrich Hayek’s The Constitution of Liberty, he asserts that laws 
made by social institutions (like governments) should be constructed to 
allow “maximum freedom to the individual who uses the law as part of 
his knowledge base in his or her decision concerning what action to 
take.”165 To this end, Austrians propose that individuals act 
entrepreneurially rather than based on an abstract calculation of utility.166 
                                                          
164 The Austrian School of Economics is an approach to economic theory in 
stark contrast to the typical neoclassical way of thinking. Instead of focusing on 
utility, rational actors, and mathematical equations in an aggregated, general 
sense, the Austrian school focuses on the individual actor’s economic decision 
in the face of uncertainty and imperfect knowledge. See John M. Czarnetzky, 
Time, Uncertainty, & the Law of Corporate Reorganizations, 67 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 2939, 2957 (1999).  
165 Linda A. Schwartzstein, An Austrian Economic View of the Legal Process, 55 
OHIO ST. L.J. 1049, 1064 (1994) (citing FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE 
CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 35 (1960)).  
166 Ludwig von Mises, one of the fathers of Austrian economic theory, 
approached economics as a study of subjective human action. He defined 
“entrepreneur” as an “acting [person] exclusively seen from the aspect of the 
uncertainty inherent in every action. In using the term, one must never forget 
that every action is imbedded in the flux of time and therefore involves a 
speculation. . . . There’s many a slip ‘twixt cup and lip.” LUDWIG VON MISES, 
HUMAN ACTION: A TREATISE ON ECONOMICS (1949) at 254. See also John M. 
Czarnetzky, Time, Uncertainty, & the Law of Corporate Reorganizations, 67 
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Rather than treating time as an allocable resource per the neoclassical 
view, Austrians view time as dynamic, something that acts on an 
individual from one moment to the next as that individual makes 
subjective decisions and acquires greater information with which to 
make future decisions.167  
Over time, these subjective decisions yield (albeit imperfect) 
knowledge, decreasing mutual ignorance across social interactions.168 
“[T]he market process provides the context and incentive for 
entrepreneurs to perceive and exploit opportunities in the form of market 
gaps or disequilibrium.”169 Professor David Harper proposed the “growth 
of knowledge” model of entrepreneurship,170 positing that individuals 
constantly formulate hypotheses to solve problems encountered in the 
market, and so are constantly engaging in a learning curve of trial and 
error.171  
Now to return to the “intersection” mentioned at the beginning of 
the subsection. The series LLC offers greater freedom for business 
owners to make decisions, per Hayek’s notion that laws should maximize 
individual freedom of choice.172 Individual entrepreneurs in the market 
are the best suited to acquire knowledge through trial and error in social 
or market interactions.173 And social institutions, like the government, 
should encourage entrepreneurs to make decisions to increase overall 
human knowledge and incentivize growth.174 Or, put more succinctly by 
Milton Friedman, “Governments never learn. People learn.”  
Milton Friedman was the founder of the Chicago School of 
Economic Thought, somewhat related to the Austrian School as both are 
“methodological individualists.”175 Although they differ wildly on the 
proper approach to economics, and methodology thereof, the ultimate 
                                                                                                                                  
FORDHAM L. REV. 2939, 2957 (1999).  
167 See GERALD P. O’DRISCOLL, JR. & MARIO J. RIZZO, THE ECONOMICS OF 
TIME AND IGNORANCE 52-70 (1985).  
168 Professor Israel Kirzner first posited this theory of markets in the Austrian 
school. See ISRAEL M. KIRZNER, COMPETITION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP (1973). 
169 Czarnetzky, supra note 164 at 2958-59.  
170 DAVID A. HARPER, ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND THE MARKET PROCESS: AN 
ENQUIRY INTO THE GROWTH OF KNOWLEDGE at 5 (1996).  
171 Id. at 121.  
172 Hayek, supra note 165.  
173 Hayek, supra note 165.  
174 Czarnetzky, supra note 164 at 2959. 
175 See Karl-Heinz Paqué, How Far is Vienna from Chicago? An Essay on the 
Methodology of Two Schools of Dogmatic Liberalism. 38 KYKLOS 412 (1985).  
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policy prescriptions made by both are solidly “free-market.”176 In his 
seminal work, Capitalism and Freedom, Friedman carefully explains that 
government serves two important twin interests in the market: to create a 
forum “‘rules of the game’” and to then enforce those rules. 177 “What the 
market does is to reduce greatly the range of issues that must be decided 
through political means, and thereby to minimize the extent to which 
government need participate directly in the game.”178 He proposes that 
free markets are what allow for division of labor, specialization, and 
diversification of thought and action.179 He famously once said he was 
“in favor of cutting taxes under any circumstanc[e] and for any excuse, 
and for any reason, whenever it [was] possible.”180  
The notion of complex fiscal policy is far outside the scope of 
this article, but Friedman’s words are nevertheless relevant here. Annual 
filing fees are, in the simplest sense, still an annual tax on the business. 
The series LLC form helps businesses by creating annual savings, which 
in turn adds to the overall wealth of the marketplace and allows for 
greater creativity and business growth, which helps investors achieve 
greater returns on investment. The series LLC form offers significant 
opportunity to diversify risk.181 For business owners, this means isolation 
of a riskier business venture in one distinct series, minimizing the risk of 
contagion to other healthier, lower-risk series. Businesses can make 
higher risk decisions, and allow for greater market creativity. And, if the 
series LLC statute is structured properly, creditors will be on notice that 
they have invested in an individual series. Risk-averse creditors can 
select individual lower-risk series, rather than investing in a business as a 
whole.  
It is important to balance the seemingly competing interests of 
pro-business factions with the legitimate concerns of pro-creditor, pro-
plaintiff protection. There is concern that series LLCs create more risk 
for investors because they might be unaware of the limitations of 
investing in a series, or that a series can be used for nefarious 
                                                          
176 Robert P. Murphy, The Chicago School versus the Austrian School, available 
at https://perma.cc/EXN7-NV56.  
177 MILTON FRIEDMAN & ROSE FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 15 
(1982) (“These then are the basic roles of government in a free society: to 
provide a means whereby we can modify the rules, to mediate differences 
among us on the meaning of the rules, and to enforce compliance with the rules 
on the part of those few who would otherwise not play the game.”).  
178 Id.  
179 Id.  
180 See Becker Friedman Institute, available at https://perma.cc/B8H9-8P8B. 
181 Fezzi, supra note 4, at 914.  
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purposes.182 These concerns are systemic to all business forms to some 
extent, but the insular nature of the series may exacerbate these fears.  
Ultimately, however, these two “competing” interests work 
together. Businesses have an inherent incentive to act in a way that 
promotes investment and protects creditors. Without creditors, most 
businesses could never get off the ground. Without investment, the 
economy would shrink measurably. If a business looks too risky, or has 
mistreated creditors in the past, why would any creditor ever invest in it 
again? If a business is acting rationally, they will act in a way that 
protects their creditors and increases the likelihood they will receive 
future investment.  
 
ii. Short-Term Annual Filing Revenue Loss is 
Outweighed by Long-Term Growth Gains  
 
Policymakers may be wary to select legislation that, on its face, 
seems to reduce the overall state tax revenue. But this inquiry leaves out 
the balancing of the short-term pain of revenue loss with the long-term 
gains from a larger, more productive tax base. It is easy to look at a 
state’s budget for a given year and say the loss of revenue cannot be 
absorbed, or the money generated by annual business filings is 
designated for some specific purpose.183 The United States economy as a 
whole is still feeling the effects of the 2008 economic downturn, and it 
may be better for the long-term health of state economies to innovate, 
incentivize growth, and promote the formation of new business.184  
One of the best ways to encourage this kind of long-term health 
is to help business owners save money on annual taxes. That aggregated 
tens of millions of dollars in savings will remain in the pocket of small 
business owners who can then redistribute that money throughout the 
state and local economy, diversifying business, creating competition, and 
promoting investment. The short-term pain felt by states in losing state 
filing fees should be exactly that: short-term. Because if the economy 
within the state grows as a result of business savings, the tax base within 
the state will grow and ultimately the state will reap those rewards. In 
sum, although states may experience a short-term loss in revenue, the 
                                                          
182 Id.  
183 For example, in Mississippi the money generated from foreign LLC filings is 
used to fund all elections within the state. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 23-15-5 
(2016).  
184 See Ben Leubsdorf, The Recession’s Economic Trauma Has Left Enduring 
Scars, WALL ST. J. (May 9, 2016), https://perma.cc/6W3A-9Z92. 
31
Pohl: Taking the Series LLC Seriously: Why States Should Adopt This Inn
Published by Digital Commons at Michigan State University College of Law, 2017
 
 
238 Journal of Business & Securities Law Vol. 17 
benefits of a larger and increasingly productive tax base should 
eventually supplant that loss by increasing the overall wealth of the state.  
The series LLC form is optimal for business owners operating 
multiple businesses. The benefits and structure of the series are most 
obvious in a real estate or investment context. The SLLC’s ramifications 
for small business have repeatedly been overlooked, for occasionally 
paternalistic reasons. The ULC first refused to include series LLC 
provisions in RULLCA because they were concerned citizens would not 
understand how to use the entity.185 Several states have refused adoption 
for similar reasons. However, publicizing information on appropriate 
state websites, and ensuring information about SLLCs in their state is 
readily available, should alleviate concerns over potential confusion. It is 
also somewhat paternalistic to assume that the series form can only be 
used in “sophisticated” business states like Delaware.186 This assumes no 
creativity in the market.  
Importantly, though, this means the series LLC form is not right 
for every business. A person who owns and operates only one business, 
with no immediate plans to expand, should not form as a series LLC. 
Although the state will be losing some annual revenue from business 
filing fees, that money will not completely dry up because not everyone 
will choose the series LLC form. This means the state will still receive 
considerable income each year from state business filings. But for those 
business owners operating multiple LLCs in the same state, the state is 
not “double-dipping” and collecting from the same entrepreneur multiple 
times over.  
                                                          
185 See Mertens, supra note 4, at 304-06. 
186 Daniel S. Kleinberger, Progress Report on the Revised Uniform Limited 
Liability Company Act (“ULLCA”) and the Issue of “Corpfuscation,” Vol. 
XXIII A.B.A. THE SEC. OF BUS. L. PROGRAM, Mar. 2006 at 7, 8-9 (citations 
omitted) (“Originally devised by sophisticated Delaware lawyers for their 
‘funds’ clients, series are now being (mis)used to subdivide assets of operating 
businesses and to provide unwarranted hopes of low cost ‘asset protection’. . . . 
[w]hat’s good for Delaware and highly sophisticated business deals is not 
necessarily good for the LLC law of other states. A philosophy that works 
wonders for ‘high end’ transactions may be bad medicine for thousands of more 
prosaic but nonetheless important closely held businesses that choose to house 
themselves within LLCs.”); See also Fezzi, supra note 4, at 917-18 (“Clearly, 
the ULC was taking a patriarchal stance for states other than Delaware. Besides 
the ULC Drafting Committee, many commentators were worried about non-
Delaware practitioners misunderstanding the formalities of the series LLC, and 
thus opening themselves up to liability.”).  
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Finally, States should consider the adoption of the series LLC in 
the context of their existing business entity law.187 For example, states 
that have already adopted the Revised Uniform Limited Liability 
Company Act, or the Model Business Corporation Act, may find it fairly 
simple to adopt most of the language of the upcoming Limited Liability 
Company Protected Series Act (July 2016 Annual Meeting Draft).188 For 
states that already recognize “series” under their laws as classes of stock 
or membership interests, it may require slightly more drafting to make 
sure those code provisions remain explicitly distinguishable.189  
 
B. Statutory Construction Should Include Equity Factors 
from Substantive Consolidation to Minimize Risk of 
Asset Collapse  
 
Equity factors from substantive consolidation should be included 
in the statutory language as an inverse. For example, a judge will look to 
see if two businesses operate under the same bank account, and if they 
do, that will weigh in favor of consolidating the two businesses as one 
asset pool. However, if a policymaker includes a requirement in the 
statute that businesses operate separate bank accounts, this will mitigate 
the likelihood of consolidation later by forcing business owners to 
comply during formation.  
 
i. The July 2016 Annual Meeting Draft Offers 
Improvement, But Left Substantive Consolidation 
Potential Mostly Unmitigated 
 
In July of 2017, the National Conference of Commissioners on 
Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) is expected to release the final version 
of the Limited Liability Company Protected Series Act (July 2016 
Annual Meeting Draft).190 The NCCUSL has made several strategic 
choices to improve the marketability of the series LLC to state 
legislatures. First, they designated “series” as “protected series,” 
                                                          
187 See supra, Part I, Section (B)(iii). The July 2016 Annual Meeting Draft is 
purposefully structured to complement existing limited liability company to 
maximize understanding and ease of cross-referencing.  
188 See supra Part III, Section 1.  
189 Minnesota is a good example. See MINN. STAT. § 302A.137 (2016).  
190 Introduction to 2016 Annual Meeting Reading of the Limited Liability 
Company Protected Series Act (f/k/a Series of Unincorporated Business Entities 
Act), available at https://perma.cc/SZY9-KZJS.  
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adopting a term of art to separate the general terminology of “series” 
from the traditional usage in classes of stock.191 The Uniform Act 
incorporates much of the innovative language from the Illinois statute, 
with a few additions: series LLCs would create “protected series” which 
must include the name designation of “P.S.,” the series LLC must file 
annually with the Secretary of State, and include a list of all the protected 
series under its umbrella, in order to obtain a “certificate of good 
standing” from the Secretary of State to provide to any potential investor 
or creditor.192 The July 2016 Annual Meeting Draft contains clear, 
concrete language creating two types of liability shields: vertical 
(traditional parent-to-subsidiary), and horizontal (brother-to-sister).193 
Clearly, protected series are liable for their debts and obligations, and 
investors should be on notice as such.  
Interestingly, the July 2016 Annual Meeting Draft continues the 
position that a protected series is not subject to merger or acquisition, 
despite asserting “[a] series is . . . a person.”194 The July 2016 Annual 
Meeting Draft also continues the practice from Delaware of not requiring 
a protected series to establish an operating agreement, only requiring the 
parent series LLC to do so.195 Although the July 2016 Annual Meeting 
Draft kept some of the language of “certificate of designation” from the 
Illinois statute, they left out important language pertaining to what the 
certificate contains. The Illinois statute requires a certificate of 
designation be filed for the creation of each series, containing the names 
of the members or managers of that series, to be on file with the 
Secretary of State’s office for creditor-notice purposes.196 The July 2016 
Annual Meeting Draft requires the operating agreement to contain the 
names of the protected series and any managers or members.197 No state 
currently requires an LLC to file their operating agreement with the 
Secretary of State, so how could creditors obtain the names of managers 
or members if those names are not listed on a certificate of designation? 
The July 2016 Annual Meeting Draft does encourage transparency by 
making public the identity of the series, and whether a given business is a 
                                                          
191 Ltd. Liab. Co. Protected Series Act (July 2016 Annual Meeting Draft) supra 
note 1.  
192 Id. at §§ 201- 202, § 205.  
193 Id. at § 401.  
194 Id. at § 102(7).  
195 Id. at § 107.  
196 805 ILCS 180/37-40(d).  
197 Ltd. Liab. Co. Protected Series Act (July 2016 Annual Meeting Draft) supra 
note 1, at § 302(b).  
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protected series.198 But it does not make public the names of members or 
managers of any protected series, by including those requirements only 
in the operating agreement.  
This language removes some of the uncertainty regarding 
judicial treatment and rights of series LLCs, but it may be prudent to go a 
step further and include as many factors borrowed from substantive 
consolidation doctrine as possible. In substantive consolidation, the legal 
relationship between the two entities is much more important than the 
business form.199 For example, it might be more indicative of the series’ 
independence if it were allowed to merge with other series or businesses. 
The July 2016 Annual Meeting Draft requires that all associated 
members of a protected series also be members of the series LLC 
parent.200 The Act does not clarify why it made this decision, but it might 
make substantive consolidation more likely because courts are often 
looking at the overlap in management or ownership between business 
entities. Instead, the Act might require that each series have an 
unaffiliated member, for the purposes of maintaining separate entity 
status.  
ii. Risks and Rewards for Both Businesses and 
Creditors  
 
Substantive consolidation may, unwittingly, prioritize the 
recovery of less risk-averse investors. For example, if Series X carries 
riskier assets than Series Y and Z, and the investors in Series X are sure 
that a bankruptcy court will substantively consolidate all series should 
Series X become insolvent, they are safe in assuming their investment 
can be recouped against Series Y and Z. However, this punishes the 
investors of Series Y and Z who may have purposefully selected a less-
risky asset for their portfolio by raising the endemic risk across all the 
series X, Y, and Z. In fact, it removes a lot of the appeal of the series 
LLC, namely that investors can diversify their portfolios based on risk-
assessments, without the concerns of investing in a whole business.201  
By including notice provisions in the series LLC statute, 
creditors can make a better-informed investment decision.202 This 
                                                          
198 Supra note 1, § 202.  
199 2-105 COLLIER’S ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 105.09.  
200 Supra, note 1, § 302. 
201 See Christopher S. McLoon & Margaret C. Callaghan, The Dangerous 
Charm of the Series LLC, 24 ME. B.J. 226, 227 (2009).  
202 See Fink, supra note 7, at 613 (“Creditors know to check filings to see if an 
entity has limited liability.”).  
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provision also protects businesses, because creditors should be on notice 
that they have invested in a series and not a whole business.203 And it 
also protects creditors, who can select more or less-risky series for their 
portfolio.204  
The series LLC form may encourage business owners to put their 
more creative (but risky) business ideas into action but with far less risk. 
If a business owner is concerned that a riskier business idea might cause 
contagion to the rest of the business’ assets should it go under, they are 
probably unlikely to put that idea into action. However, by removing that 
riskier asset to a protected series, a business owner can limit the risk to 
other less-risky protected series within the SLLC.205 This promotes 
creativity in the market, and the potential for greater growth. 
 
V. BANKRUPTCY COURTS SHOULD ADOPT A REBUTTABLE 
PRESUMPTION THAT PROTECTED SERIES ARE SEPARATE AND 
DISTINCT ENTITIES TO BALANCE PRO-CREDITOR/PRO-BUSINESS 
INTERESTS 
 
If a business is properly incorporated a series LLC, then a 
bankruptcy judge should find a rebuttable presumption that a series is a 
separate and distinct entity.206 There are indications that a series would 
be considered distinct in its own right, because the IRS has issued an 
opinion letter saying series would be separate for tax purposes.207 
Although it has never been directly litigated or stated, literature suggests 
that an individual series meets the qualifications of a “person” under the 
bankruptcy code.208 For bankruptcy “personhood,” a business needs to 
have the “rights and powers” of a corporation.209 It is now widely 
accepted that an LLC qualifies as a person under the Code, and it is 
likely with time and increased litigation, the series form would also 
qualify.210  
                                                          
203 Id. 
204 Fezzi, supra note 4, at 913 (“Rather than invest in a single, which many 
contain both conservative and riskier assets, the series LLC structure allows 
investors to choose which assets to place in their portfolio.”). 
205 Id. 
206 See Bahena, supra note 26, at 815.  
207 I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,211 (Jan. 13, 1984). 
208 See supra, Part II (A). 
209 See supra, note 94.  
210 See supra, note 97. 
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But, no bankruptcy court, or other court, has taken up the issue. 
The only cases examining a series LLC are Alphonse and GxG 
Management, neither of which held anything related to series LLCs; both 
cases mention series LLC in dicta, claiming they are mostly notable for 
the unanswered questions they present. Ultimately, if the series LLC 
form was created for its dual internal liability shields, it would render the 
series LLC a pointless theoretical exercise if, in practice, courts are 
regularly finding all series LLCs to be one larger business form ripe for 
consolidation or veil-piercing.  
 
A. If Not a Rebuttable Presumption, Then What? (A 
Theoretical Exercise) 
 
i. Always Separate (Never Consolidate)  
 
Courts could decide that series LLCs are always separate 
entities, and never consolidate or pierce the veil. This argument is 
theoretical ad absurdum, as no court is going to de facto always decide 
one way. But for the argument’s sake, this provides some clarity. 
Although this is the very purpose of the series LLC form, to insulate 
assets and risk from one another, this does not fairly balance pro-creditor 
interests. Creditors would nearly always be left without a way to recoup 
their losses if an individual series LLC became insolvent. And finally, 
series LLCs could become the safe harbor of murky investments and 
dark money that many fear that they are. To always treat series LLC as 
separate may open the door to anti-creditor action on behalf of 
businesses who feel they have nothing to lose by engaging in such 
behavior.  
 
ii. Always One Entity (Always Consolidate) 
 
Courts could also treat series LLCs as always one business, a 
position bolstered in states like Texas that specifically state series LLCs 
are not a separate, domestic entity under state law.211 This complicates 
the bankruptcy ramifications of a series, because often-state corporate 
law is being applied in substantive consolidation proceedings. 
Consistently treating series LLCs as one family, one business unfairly 
tips the scale towards creditors, as the business is never able to take full 
advantage of the internal liability shields typifying the series form. This 
                                                          
211 See TEX. CODE ANN. §101.622.  
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position may also unfairly favor certain creditors over others, as the 
rights of riskier investors may be de facto prioritized over more risk-
averse creditors who purposefully selected safer series for investment. 
Finally, this response by courts begs the question why even attempt to 
use a SLLC? If one is sure a court is never going to observe the internal 
liability shields typifying the structure, then what is the incentive for 
using it in the first place?  
 
B. Statutory Construction Alone is too Pro-Business, 
Rebuttable Presumption Balances Pro-Creditor 
Concerns Equitably 
 
A rebuttable presumption is the right choice for bankruptcy 
courts because it strikes the proper balance between protecting creditors 
and incentivizing business. If businesses are exercising their duty of care 
to ensure they are incorporated correctly and are minding all the statutory 
requirements of a series, then the courts will “reward” them with a 
rebuttable presumption of separateness. However, courts are able to 
“punish” series LLCs for any wrongdoing in formation, particularly 
those errors that negate creditor notice.212  
Recognizing series to be separate and distinct is important for all 
creditors, because each series will have its own individual investors. It 
would be unfair to the investors of Series 2 if Series 1 declares 
bankruptcy, and a judge consolidates all assets to redress the creditors of 
Series 1. In this case, the Series 2 investors are being needlessly 
punished. Instead, the procedure would look just like any other corporate 
bankruptcy: the series becomes insolvent, the court awards its liquidated 
assets to creditors in hierarchical order. So, in our example, Series 1’s 
investors could collect from the liquidated assets of this series, and the 
assets of Series 2 would remain completely untouched.  
By adopting a rebuttable presumption of separateness, courts can 
respect the internal liability shields of a series, but balance creditor 
interests. If a series LLC fails to observe the proper corporate formalities, 
or incorporates/files documents incorrectly, then creditors can effectively 
punish a series LLC for this failure. 
 
 
 
                                                          
212 Compare Bahena, supra note 26, at 814.  
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C. Rebuttable Presumption Makes Sense in Context of 
Analogous Law  
 
Series LLC should be considered separate and distinct, 
especially upon considering other analogous examples.  
 
i. Consolidated Federal Tax Returns  
 
Analogies from other areas of law, even sometimes completely 
unrelated law, may prove illustrative. In the case of the series LLC, an 
example from corporate tax law may be instructive, namely consolidated 
returns. Generally, corporations report their annual income, make 
deductions, and file this paperwork with the Internal Revenue Service 
separately from one another. However, for those taxpayers owning or 
operating multiple businesses (“affiliated corporations”), this annual 
filing can be expensive and tedious. Provisions allowing for consolidated 
returns instead permit affiliated corporations to file one consolidated 
return as if they were one single corporation, provided they all share a 
common parent corporation.213 However, even though the federal tax 
liability of affiliated groups of corporations is based on the combined 
taxable income of its members, “the separate tax identity of each member 
of the group is respected through maintenance of individual earnings and 
profits accounts.”214  
Although this area of tax law has been in a state of flux, recent 
trends in regulation indicate single entity status; that the several member-
corporations of the affiliated group are treated in the same manner as 
divisions of a single corporation.215  
Here we have a group of affiliated corporations with overlapping 
shareholders, consolidating their federal tax documents as a single entity 
                                                          
213 PAUL R. MCDANIEL et al., FEDERAL INCOME TAX OF BUSINESS 
ORGANIZATIONS 823 (David L. Shapiro et al. eds., 2nd ed. 1997) (“An affiliated 
group consists of the common parent and one or more chains of corporations 
connected through stock ownership with the common parent. I.R.C. §1504(a)(1). 
The common parent must own stock of at least one other corporation that 
represents at least 80 percent of the total voting power of the stock and has value 
equal to at least 80 percent of the total value of the stock of the corporation. . . . . 
Thus, a single chain of connected corporations or parallel brother-sister 
corporations connected to a common parent corporation can qualify as an 
affiliated group.”).  
214 Treas. Reg. §§ 1.1502-14, -19, -31, -32, and -33.  
215 MCDANIEL, supra note 213, at 819-23. 
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for ease, convenience, lower cost, and less red tape. The parallel to the 
series LLC is unmistakable: a group of affiliated protected series, and 
their common parent, are filing one annual Secretary of State report as if 
they were one limited liability company in their state of formation 
because it is convenient, more cost-effective, and decreases potential 
regulatory pitfalls. The series LLC is the functional equivalent of the 
federal consolidated tax return, but for state filing at the state level.  
In the earlier discussion of “alter ego” doctrine in the bankruptcy 
context,216 there is a list of several elements and factors used by courts in 
its determination. Here, it is important to distinguish that alter ego theory 
is relevant to both bankruptcy and corporate veil piercing (a variant of 
fraud doctrine).217 To give the briefest of explanations for clarity’s sake, 
corporate veil piercing is the disregarding of the corporate form by a 
court to make a plaintiff whole for fraud or misrepresentation by the 
corporation.218 This doctrine employs many of the same elements and 
factors as substantive consolidation doctrine; courts are looking for many 
of the same actions by corporations. 
One miscellaneous factor occasionally raised by plaintiffs in 
corporate veil piercing suits is consolidated financial filings or tax 
returns.219 However, courts have generally held these statements 
insufficient: a parent corporation’s “decision to include [its subsidiary] in 
its consolidated tax return hardly demonstrates domination.”220 Meaning, 
consolidated tax returns cannot serve as a sufficient basis for imposing 
liability under an alter ego theory.221 “[C]onsolidating the activities of a 
subsidiary into the parent’s annual reports is a common business practice 
. . . allowed by both the Internal Revenue Service and the Securities and 
Exchange Commission, and it is recommended by generally accepted 
accounting principles.”222 
                                                          
216 See Gilbert, supra note 131, at 211.  
217 Outokumpu Eng’g Enters. v. Kvaerner Enviropower, 685 A.2d 724, 729 
(Del. Super. Ct. 1996) (noting alter ego theory and veil piercing are 
“analogous”).  
218 Douglas G. Smith, Piercing the Corporate Veil in Regulated Industries, BYU 
L. Rev. 1165, 1180 (2008). 
219 Id. at 1178.  
220 AT&T Co. v. Compagnie Bruxelles Lambert, 94 F.3d 586, 591 (9th Cir. 
1996).  
221 Lowell Staats Min. Co. v. Pioneer Uravan, Inc., 878 F.2d 1259, 1264 (10th 
Cir. 1989).  
222 Calvert v. Huckins, 875 F. Supp. 674, 678-79 (E.D. Cal. 1995); see also 
Dalton v. R & W Marine, Inc., 897 F.2d 1359, 1363 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding no 
alter ego liability despite filing a consolidated tax return, among other factors, 
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Courts have examined consolidated federal tax returns in the 
veil-piercing context and considered them not to be indicative of either 
an alter ego relationship or a factual unitary whole of the affiliated 
organizations. Following this line of thinking through to series LLCs, the 
fact that series file one consolidated annual state report should not impact 
their status as separate and distinct entities. Theoretically, a federal tax 
return should be strong evidence to disregard the corporate fiction 
because the federal government—a preemptive body—is treating a 
business as one. But if such a preemptive body as a federal agency is 
treating state-formed entities as functionally separate, but-for ease of 
annual filing purposes, this is strong evidence to support the rebuttable 
presumption of separateness of series LLCs in a substantive 
consolidation bankruptcy case. 
 
ii. Corporate Structure Analogy: Hedge Funds  
 
Hedge funds are structured analogously to series LLCs, which 
may help illustrate bankruptcy treatment. Hedge funds are generally 
formed as individual limited partnerships or limited liability partnerships, 
usually operating within the greater structure of a bank or investment 
portfolio (sometimes a fund of funds).223 This individual LP may co-exist 
with a large number of other LPs, within the same umbrella organization. 
There is typically one general partner, usually a corporation or an 
individual (possibly the manager of the fund).224 And then, the limited 
partners are typically the individual investors of that fund.225 Series LLCs 
are not quite the same, but they have enough similarities that this analogy 
is instructive.  
We do not really think of “hedge funds” as declaring bankruptcy, 
although they certainly can.226 More often, colloquially, we say that if a 
                                                                                                                                  
for affiliated corporations); O’Berry v. McDermott, Inc., 712 S.W.2d 206, 207 
(Tex. App. 1986) (holding that, among other factors, filing a consolidated tax 
return was insufficient to support alter ego theory).  
223 Joseph G. Nichols, Hedge Fund of Funds Investing: An Investor’s Guide, 
BLOOMBERG PRESS at 16-17, 51 (2004).  
224 Id. at 16. (“The general partner can be an individual or a corporation and is 
responsible for the management and operation of the partnership and has 
unlimited liability. The manager will typically be the general partner but act 
through an entity to avoid unlimited personal liability for fund obligations.”).  
225 Id.  
226 See S. Ari Mushell, Feature, Dodd-Frank and Hedge Funds: An Uneasy 
Fit?, 32-6 ABIJ 38 (July 2013).  
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hedge fund goes under, the individual limited partnership itself holding 
the investment asset liquidates. It sells off all assets and pays out 
investors to the fullest extent possible. It would be unusual for the 
operating bank or investment company, even if they were the general 
partner to the partnership, to declare bankruptcy or go out of business if 
just one hedge fund within its greater portfolio of investments closes. To 
summarize, and prevent unnecessarily arcane details, the recent sub-
prime mortgage crisis is a good example. In July of 2007 two of Bear 
Stearns’ flagship hedge funds closed, however Bear Stearns did not itself 
declare bankruptcy.227  
Series LLCs operate in a similar way: if an individual series 
declares bankruptcy, that one series liquidates, pays off its creditors, and 
closes.228 The parent series LLC, and the other series within that parent, 
do not also (necessarily) declare bankruptcy or close.  
 
VI. APPLICATION 
 
This section explores the plight of a fictional business owner, 
named Stephen Serial. In subsection A, his state, State X, has adopted the 
statutory construction of the SLLC form advocated in Part IV supra, and 
he has elected to form a series LLC. Unfortunately, in subsection B, one 
of his protected series declares bankruptcy and he finds himself in 
federal bankruptcy court. Here we discuss how the legal mechanism of a 
rebuttable presumption for separateness might really look in practice.  
 
A.  Statutory Construction 
 
State X has decided to adopt the series LLC. It has previously 
adopted the Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act, and chose 
to adopt the close variant of the Model Act advocated here. To 
summarize, the law designates series LLCs as having “protected series.” 
Protected series are considered “persons” under the law, and can sue and 
be sued in their own name, and own property, just as any other limited 
liability company. The law requires separate bookkeeping between 
protected series, and prohibits commingling of funds. Protected series 
must file a certificate of designation with the Secretary of State’s office 
                                                          
227 Fin. Crisis Inquiry Comm’n, The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report: Final 
Report of The National Commission on the Causes of the Financial and 
Economic Crisis in the United States, 240 (2011).  
228 See Ltd. Liab. Co. Protected Series Act (July 2016 Annual Meeting Draft), 
supra note 1.  
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per the Model Act, but rather than requiring the members and managers 
only be listed in the operating agreement, they must also be listed on the 
certificate of designation for their respective protected series. 
Additionally, each protected series must have at least one member or 
manager unaffiliated with the parent series. Merger and acquisition is 
permitted for a protected series. Finally, protected series are allowed to 
consolidate for tax filing purposes, contract jointly, and work 
cooperatively with another if they so choose.  
Steven Serial owns ten rental properties, currently as multiple 
LLCs. State X requires a $500 annual filing fee per LLC.229 This means 
he’s currently paying $5,000 in annual state filing fees alone, not 
including the costs of hiring an accountant and lawyer to put together all 
the proper documentation for each respective LLC. He wants to convert 
his ten limited liability companies into one SLLC now that State X has 
adopted the form. He knows this will save him thousands of dollars each 
year, and give him greater flexibility in management. He plans to use the 
saved annual revenue to add more rental properties to his portfolio, and 
grow his business.  
He has complied, to the best of his knowledge, with all the 
statutory provisions set forth in the statute. His formation documents 
filed with the Secretary of State’s office include that his business is an 
SLLC with the right to create protected series, named “Serial Rental 
Properties, SLLC.” Each of his ten rental properties have been renamed 
to a variation of “Serial Rental Properties, Series ___, P.S.” He maintains 
separate bank accounts, accounting books, and records for each of his 10 
rental properties. He has recruited 10 different individuals to serve as 
members or managers of each protected series, whose names appear on 
the appropriate certificates of designation filed with the Secretary of 
State’s office.  
 
B. Rebuttable Presumption 
 
Unfortunately for Stephen Serial, the rental property owned by 
Series J has a disastrous mold problem all throughout the walls of the 
structure. It has been unwittingly causing the tenant, Mindy Moulder, 
horrible health problems ever since she moved in. She files suit against 
Protected Series J to recover for the cost of her medical expenses, breach 
of the implied warranty of habitability, and emotional distress caused by 
                                                          
229 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 156(c) §12(d) (designed to mimic a real-life 
situation, I have chosen to use Massachusetts as a reference, as it requires a $500 
annual filing fee for domestic LLCs).  
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the systemic, long-term illness she has now developed. In paying the 
settlement of the lawsuit, Protected Series J becomes insolvent and 
declares bankruptcy. Steven Serial had brought in several investors for 
his various protected series, to increase the capital structure of his 
business. One of the investors in Series J is Irving Investment.  
At the bankruptcy proceeding, Irving tries to claim several things 
in an effort to recover as much as possible of his investment. He claims 
that: Series J is just an alter ego of “Serial Rental Properties, SLLC” and 
Protected Series A-I; he did not receive adequate notice that he had only 
invested in Series J and did not know that the assets of the rest of the 
protected series would not be available for recovery. Irving stipulates 
that substantive consolidation is an appropriate remedy. Judge Jules 
determines there is a rebuttable presumption that protected series are 
considered separate and distinct under the law, and asks if Irving has 
enough evidence to rebut the presumption and substantively consolidate.  
Irving provides evidence that Protected Series J is financed by 
Serial Rental Properties, SLLC and provides monthly cash infusions to 
its accounts from the parent SLLC’s master account. Further, Serial 
Rental pays all the staff and employees affiliated with Series J (the 
cleaning service for the rental property, the agent that manages the 
accounts and shows the property to prospective renters, etc.). Serial 
Rental Properties, SLLC points to evidence that Irving knew, or should 
have known, he was investing in only Series J because the business 
complied with notice provisions under the statute. Meaning, Irving never 
relied on the credit of the entire SLLC, but rather only of Series J.  
Judge Jules weighs the evidence provided by Irving Investment 
against the rebuttable presumption of separateness to determine if there is 
a “substantial identity between” Serial Rental and Series J. Then, he 
considers if consolidation is necessary to either (1) prevent harm to 
Irving Investment, or (2) confer a benefit to him or other investors. 
Finally, Judge Jules must consider whether the evidence of wrongdoing 
provided by Irving “far outweighs” the considerable prejudice to the 
creditors of Protected Series A-I.  
If Judge Jules finds there is insufficient evidence in the record to 
indicate wrongdoing on the part of Stephen Serial/Serial Rental and 
Protected Series J, then Irving Investment will likely lose his claim to 
substantive consolidation. Meaning, his recovery will be limited to the 
liquidated assets of Protected Series J, his original investment vehicle. 
However, if Judge Jules is persuaded that Irving has raised several 
violations serious enough to warrant “punishment” of Serial Rental and 
Protected Series J, he may order substantive consolidation. However, a 
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few small potential violations may not be enough to persuade a 
bankruptcy judge to exercise their power to substantively consolidate.  
Now, using the same facts as above, imagine that Irving 
Investment also provides further evidence of potential wrongdoing: (1) 
that Series J has only one asset, the rental property previously rented by 
Ms. Moulder, conveyed to them by the parent, Serial Rental (i.e. it was 
not purchased by Series J in its own right). And, (2) Irving shows 
evidence that demonstrates the 3 members or managers of Series J do not 
act in its best interest, but rather take direction from Stephen Serial/Serial 
Rental at monthly director’s meetings and simply follow instructions. 
Given these additional potential issues, Judge Jules may find there is 
enough in the record to overcome the presumption of separateness and 
substantively consolidate Protected Series J with Serial Rental 
Properties, SLLC to make Irving whole. This determination of the 
rebuttable presumption of separateness will ultimately turn on the 
individual judge hearing the case. Generally, it is agreed upon that 
substantive consolidation is a power to be exercised sparingly, but some 
judges may be more willing than others to overcome that presumption 
(as indeed, they may be more willing to overcome the presumption of 
separateness for an SLLC).  
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
 
The series LLC offers policymakers a low-cost way to promote 
economic efficiency and new business formation in their state. Post-2008 
economic recovery has been slow;230 states are concerned about the 
stability of their economies. With the anticipated 2017 release of the 
Uniform Law Commission’s Series LLC Model Act,231 there has never 
been a better time to consider the many potential benefits of adopting the 
series LLC.  
Adopting the series will help to promote economic growth, 
decrease red tape, and maintain a balance between pro-creditor and pro-
business interests. Wealth generated by a healthy business sector 
provides the tax-base to support the important social welfare programs 
we have come to depend on like Medicare, Medicaid, Social Security, 
and Unemployment Insurance. Balancing pro-business interests with pro-
creditor is of the utmost importance when structuring economic policies. 
                                                          
230 Eric Morath, Seven Years Later Recovery Remains the Weakest of the Post-
World War II Era, WALL ST. J: REAL TIME ECONOMICS (July 29, 2016, 10:39 
AM), available at https://perma.cc/2KXW-V4K3.  
231 See supra note 1.  
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However, the series LLC purports to balance these seemingly 
competitive interests by incentivizing individual series to protect their 
creditors by including the maximum number of equity factors from 
substantive consolidation doctrine in bankruptcy. In this way, protected 
series are incentivized to act with maximum transparency.  
A rebuttable presumption of “separateness” for each series LLC 
offers the best opportunity to balance pro-creditor interests by providing 
a solution to the uncertainty: if a series observed corporate formalities 
throughout formation, annual filing, and bookkeeping, and is generally 
not misusing the corporate form, it will be rewarded with the rebuttable 
presumption of “separateness.” This allows creditors to recover only 
from the individual protected series in which they invested, or to punish 
the whole series LLC for wrongdoing in formation.  
In sum, the series LLC offers an innovative option for state 
policymakers looking for ways to stimulate their local economies. With 
its implications for small business owners, it may even incentivize 
greater business formation in the long run as more individuals are 
exposed to the benefits of the entity form. So far, uncertainty in 
bankruptcy has hindered adoption by states, but with the mechanism of a 
rebuttable presumption much of that uncertainty is alleviated. 
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